SROs in construction is often blended with the organizations co-management (co-regulation), that is, with joint participation in the management of the state and the various market agents (both producers and consumers, organizations infrastructure, etc.). System of co-regulation are also a way to control the tripartite deal, but in contrast to the self-regulation involve a wider range of participants: not only business but also the state and other interested organizations (consumer associations, trade unions, etc.). This distinction is fundamental for several reasons. Firstly, if the sro in the building are primarily aimed at protecting the interests of business in construction sector and the need to consider the interests of consumers or the threat of state intervention perceived as external constraints, the organization and co-management system used to harmonize (Divergent) interests of the various 'players'. Often elements of co-management created through the introduction of either the management structure of large corporations (mostly natural monopolies) representatives public or government regulators of business and / or the public. Co-regulation takes different organizational forms than the self-regulation.

Second, different motivations sro participants in the construction and co-regulation. If an sro leading motive for their members is a competitive advantage and other private goods, the organizations co-management solves the problem of balancing interests of various market participants. Therefore, as representatives of business interests of the industry in such organizations are involved more often than not the individual companies and business associations (including SROs). Private companies can participate in systems of co-regulation if the private benefits from participation in this system (by making rules that take into account the interests of the business sector) exceed the private costs. This is usually true for companies with monopoly or dominant position in the market.

In some cases, participation in the systems of co-regulation may be attractive for companies with smaller market share, which, however, able to obtain other than general market regulations, the benefits of participation in co-regulation (for example, the political effect for the owners or senior managers of companies). For most firms in the industry directly involved in systems of co-regulation is not attractive, because such systems are usually not selective incentives (private benefits to specific companies) and as a consequence of coming to the fore 'problem free rider '. Thirdly, the effectiveness of SROs in the construction and organization co-regulation can vary significantly as a result of differences in the functions of motivation and organizational forms of these institutions. For weak representation of any of the participants in the process (whether government, business or consumers) lose the very meaning of co-regulation as a regulatory system, built on a balance of interests of various parties.

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